Taiwan and Vietnam
Mao wanted Taiwan and Nixon wanted Vietnam but the influence of the two countries was reversed.
Orville Schell: Let me ask you about Taiwan. I mean one of the things that's quite striking when you look through the history that began in 1971 down to today, is the absolutely constant sort of policy and the expressions of that policy by Chinese leaders that they're not going to compromise on Taiwan. And this is something that bedeviled you. What I want to ask you is why do you think this question is so important when you have Scotland voting to secede from Great Britain and Quebec from Canada and self-determination is sort of the flavor of the last half of the twentieth century. What do you, how do you analyze that impulse in Chinese diplomacy and thinking?
Dr. Henry Kissinger: Of course I think you're in a better position as a student of Chinese history. Orville Schell: Well you must have thought about it a great deal because you were up against it again and again and again. Dr. Henry Kissinger: Well maybe that's where the process of alienating territory from China, well it's nearly where it began but it is part of the vestige of the nineteenth century legacy. And China has been very insistent on reclaiming Hong Kong and Macao. And reclaiming Taiwan. I have experienced it as a reality of Chinese convictions. But one also has to say that we are now in 2007, thirty six years later and the two countries have managed to develop their relationship by respecting each other's principal concerns on that issue. The Chinese concern being that there's only one China. Our concern being that we want a peaceful solution. And a succession of American presidents and Chinese leaders have navigated this in a way that up to now has proved acceptable to both societies. And enabled them to develop their relationship without having Taiwan wreck the overall effort. Orville Schell: Are you fearful that the continuing sort of stand off on this issue could come a cropper? Dr. Henry Kissinger: It's always a danger. I think both sides need to exercise restraint in respect to Taiwan. And one can also hope that the evolution of economic relations, of the internal structures of both countries, both societies, will make it possible to create a one China solution that respects the autonomy of Taiwan. But that is something that may have to, to wait. One has to be - one shouldn't think that confrontation will be tolerated forever. One should be careful that nobody wrecks the current restraint. And one should have one vision of how this process might lead to a solution. | "...convinces of their falling out but they haven't really fallen out. But I think even the most obdurate were now convinced by the end of the 1960s and Nixon felt that using the split and establishing a relationship with China would put pressure on the Soviet Union and it was necessary. The Soviets were, of course, thoroughly enjoying the spectacle of United States coming to grief in Vietnam and were proving to be rather slow to want to have a summit, to want to negotiate the arms deals and other parts of (unclear) that Nixon felt were necessary. And so Nixon felt that an opening to China would benefit the United States. He also felt that it would help the United States with Vietnam and Nixon was, like many Americans at the time, very concerned with what was going on in Vietnam, the ways in which it was damaging United States causing internal dissension and trouble abroad. As he campaigned Nixon said, I have a plan to get out of Vietnam and I am not sure he really had a very full plan but what he hoped was that by going to Beijing, by opening to China he would manage to establish a new relationship which would help him to put pressure on the North Vietnamese. He assumed, I think, wrongly that the communist world behaved rather like an army. China was one of the big Communists. China was giving a lot of support to North Vietnam. If he could establish a relationship with China and perhaps offer the Chinese something in return, he could persuade the Chinesecommunists to say to the North Vietnamese you must negotiate, well seriously then you have been with the United States and you must be prepared to ease the way out of the war for the United States. That was a hope which didn't, in fact, materialize but that was very much part of his thinking as he began to consider at what was a very dramatic shift in American foreign policy."
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Taiwan
The US chose its Taiwan policy based on the requirements of both the ROC and the PRC governments.
The US supported a 'one-China' policy and recognized the issue of Taiwan as an internal conflict within China.
As for the future of the ROC, Kissinger implied that the US would withdraw, and the ROC would submerge with the mainland.
As for the future of the ROC, Kissinger implied that the US would withdraw, and the ROC would submerge with the mainland.
Nixon's Vietnam"A majority of the American people want to keep the casualties of our brave men in Vietnam at an absolute minimum. The action I take tonight is essential if we are to accomplish that goal. We take this action not for the purpose of expanding the war into Cambodia but for the purpose of ending the war in Vietnam and winning the just peace we all desire. We have made—we will continue to make every possible effort to end this war through negotiation at the conference table rather than through more fighting on the battlefield."
| The SituationNixon needed a quick way out of Vietnam, so he turned to China. If the Chinese got the North Vietnamese to accept US terms, the US could withdraw. Unfortunately, China refused, insisting support for the seven point proposal.
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Mao's Response
"We support the seven points of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, and also the two point elaboration, and also the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. That is quite clear. And if the war there continues, whether after the withdrawal of American forces or whether there are still some American forces left and the war goes on, we will continue our support, not only to Vietnam but to all three Indochinese countries. That is inevitable. Thirdly, if the U.S. completely disinvolves itself and it becomes primarily a civil war, we would still support the sides which we are supporting, whether in Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia. That has been our position all along and we will not change it. Of course, we hope the war will stop. But your two sides have not yet found a way out, and we cannot meddle in this. We can only wait. And we have repeatedly made clear that we only have the duty to support them, not the duty to negotiate on their behalf. This has already been made clear in the four points. But I would like to say something which was not put into the communiqué. Nor is it a view that we want to impose on you; it is only our view. And that is, Mr. President, for a leader like you, who is known for your farsightedness, it would not be beneficial for you or for the honor of the United States to leave behind a “tail,” although you are still determined to carry out the withdrawal of 500,000 troops. Because there are people in Saigon and Phnom Penh who are not reliable friends, in the end the people will cast them aside. The war there might be dragged out." - Zhou